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The first Macedonian Law on General Administrative Pro-
cedure was passed in 2005, and was aimed at modernizing 
administrative procedures. The amendments of 2008 chal-
lenged certain core solutions, such as the silence of admini-
stration institute. There is change from negative presump-
tion to positive presumption when first-instance public 
administrative body is inactive. In other words, when such 
a body, at citizens’ request, does nothing within certain 
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term, the presumption is that it accepts citizens’ request. 
The aim of such a legislative solution is to increase the ef-
ficiency of public administration. Detailed legal analysis of 
the new regulation is presented in the paper. It is followed 
by similar analysis of the Law on Administrative Disputes 
of 2006. Numerous shortcomings are identified and certain 
proposals for improvement are presented in the paper.
Key words: general administrative procedure – Macedonia, 
administrative dispute, silence of administration, legal pro-
tection of the citizens’ rights, administrative efficiency  
1. Introduction
The Law on General Administrative Procedure of the Republic of Mace-
donia was passed on 26th May 2005 (LGAP, National Gazette of the 
Republic of Macedonia, NGM No. 38/2005). It represented a logical 
continuation of the founding principles that were a basis for the first codi-
fication of administrative procedure in the world – the Austrian Law on 
General Administrative Procedure of 1925. Using the groundwork of this 
Law, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia codified the conduct of administrative 
procedure in 1930, thus becoming the fourth nation in the world that 
passed a law on general administrative procedure. As it led to the creation 
and development of an entirely new kind of societal relations, in 1956 a 
new LGAP (coming into force in 1957) was passed. Even though this new 
law contained changes, it was still based on the first Yugoslav law. A few 
unimportant, yet still necessary revisions of the same law were made in 
1965, and later in 1977 and 1978. 
Finally, in 2005, the first Macedonian LGAP was adopted (following the 
independence of the Republic of Macedonia) that stipulated new and 
more adequate methods for delivery, as well as new principles of adminis-
trative procedure that were in accordance with modern times. However, 
the legislation that preceded the current LGAP was an excellent basis 
for regulating a large number of issues connected to realizing the basic 
activities of public administration – deciding in administrative cases, i.e. 
passing concrete administrative acts. Still, the legislator was careful not to 
destroy the fundaments of the law. 
The latest amendments to the LGAP from 2008 (NGM 10/2008) were 
not numerous. Nevertheless they were the first attempt to change the 
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core of some systemic solutions that had existed and functioned within 
the legal order for decades. An analysis of the institute of the silence of 
administration and its legal regulation is of special importance. 
2.  Content of the institute of silence of 
administration
What does silence of administration mean in everyday lives of citizens? 
It means ignoring the requests filed with public administration, i.e. not 
answering citizens’ requests within the periods determined by law.
What is the legal importance of this institute? For the first time since the 
beginnings of administrative-procedural rules in Macedonia, a single an-
swer to this question cannot be found. Until September 2008, the silence 
of administration represented a basis for initiating an appeal procedure or 
the initiation of an administrative dispute. 
A characteristic of the appellate procedure in the case of silence of ad-
ministration is that an appeal can be filed directly to the second-instance 
body. The appeal does not have to be given to the body with which the ini-
tial request has been filed. In such cases (when the first-instance body did 
not make a decision within one month, and for more complicated cases 
within two months; while in the newest amendments to the LGAP the 
periods are 15 and 30 days, respectively), the second-instance body acts 
on the appeal in the following way. First, it can request the first-instance 
body to give the reasons for not making the decision within the stipulated 
period. If it finds that the reasons for not making the decision within the 
stipulated period have been appropriate, or if it happened because of li-
ability on the side of the appellant, the second-instance body will give the 
first-instance body a period (not longer than 30 days) within which the 
decision must be made. However, if the reasons why the decision has not 
been made within the stipulated period are not acceptable, the second- 
-instance body can request the case file from the first-instance body. If 
it is possible for the second-instance body to decide on the case on the 
grounds of case file, it will make a decision. If it is not possible to do so, 
it will conduct a procedure, or, exceptionally, will order the first-instance 
body to conduct a procedure and send back the information within a sti-
pulated period. After receiving the information, the second-instance body 
will make a final decision. This decision is treated as a second-instance 
decision even though a first-instance decision was not formally made. 
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1.  In which cases does silence mean acceptance, according 
to the latest legislative changes
One of the most important changes is the introduction of the new Article 
129/2of the LGAP. It has stipulated that silence of administration means 
the acceptance of citizen’s request. In order to explain the essence of this 
new article and its applicability or inapplicability in practice, it is neces-
sary to give an overview of several changes that led to the change of this 
article.
The first, more serious, change was made in the part of the LGAP con-
taining the basic principles of administrative procedure. It concerned the 
two-instance principle, i.e. the right to appeal contained within Article 
14/1 of the LGAP. Before the changes, it stated, »The party has the right 
to appeal against a first-instance decision«. Now the two-instance prin-
ciple cannot remain the basic principle of administrative procedure, as 
the article states, »The right to appeal against a concrete administrative 
act passed in a first-instance procedure by a state administrative body, or-
ganization, or other body with public competences, is regulated by law«. 
This amendment is an attempt to operationalise an amendment to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, according to which an appeal 
or other legal protection against the first-instance administrative acts is 
allowed. So, when there is no higher body than the one that passed the 
first-instance administrative act, instead of appeal, the Constitution al-
lows for a direct initialization of an administrative dispute. This article 
of the Constitution is interpreted by the legislator very rigidly and nar-
rowly, because the possibility the Constitution grants does mean a diver-
gence from the two-instance principle, but rather an exception. Instead, 
the amendments to the LGAP have stipulated a full derogation of this 
principle, even as a general principle, and the citizen’s right to appeal has 
become a possibility that can (but does not have to) be applied in each in-
dividual substantive law. Nevertheless, this article remains part of the Law 
titled »Basic Principles«. This is merely another nomotechnical mistake of 
the legislator, or more precisely, the creator of this legal text.
We can proceed to the analysis of Article 129, which is presented to the 
public as a foundation for exceeding the efficiency of public administra-
tion and »regulatory guillotine«. In the first part of Article 129, a novelty 
is implemented regarding the form of the request through which a party 
can initiate an administrative procedure. Prior to the amendments of 
2008, there was no request for such a form. With the latest amendments 
to the Law, there is now a possibility (not an obligation) that a special 
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law may define the form and content of the party’s request, as well as the 
term during which a body must make a decision. This part of Article 129 
is of the utmost importance because silence of administration will mean 
acceptance of the request only if the conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, in 
order for »silence-acceptance« provision to produce the expected results, 
it is necessary to fulfil all the following conditions stipulated by the law 
1) it has to be a procedure initiated by a request of a party; 2) the form 
and content of the request must be established by the law; 3) the period 
for acting, i.e. passing a decision, by the body competent for acting in the 
procedure is established by a substantive law.
These are the conditions stipulated by Article 129/1. In the second subsec-
tion of the same Article it is stipulated that »In the cases from Section 1 of 
this Article, if the competent body does not decide within the stipulated 
term, it will be considered that the request of the party is accepted within 
the procedure and conditions stipulated by law«. At first sight, these legal 
changes do not stipulate stringent conditions with regard to the applica-
tion of the new »silence-acceptance« principle. However, the situation is 
entirely different. In order for the new procedural principle to be applied 
in an administrative procedure, it is necessary to change even the existing 
substantive law through which government bodies and organizations with 
public authority function when deciding on citizens’ rights, obligations 
and legal interest. Thus, every substantive law must stipulate the form 
and content of the acts that each competent body will pass. According to 
the LGAP, it must also stipulate a specific term if the legislator wishes to 
derogate the general terms for conducting administrative procedures.
The amendments to the LGAP connected to the institute of silence of 
administration are also related to the shortened terms for passing admini-
strative acts. Thus, the general term for simple administrative cases, in 
which not all legal procedural actions are necessary, is shortened from one 
month to 15 days. In complicated cases, where it used to be two months, 
the term has been shortened to 30 days.
Furthermore, Article 221/2, which stipulates that if a competent body 
does not make a decision within the stipulated term and does not send 
the administrative act to the party; and an appeal is permissible, the party 
has the right to appeal as if his/her request has been rejected. The fact 
that this Article remains within the legal framework is odd, because it is in 
full collision with the newly legislated »principle« that silence of admini-
stration means acceptance of the request. Nevertheless, there has been 
an amendment to Article 221/2 stating, »Unless it has been stipulated 
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differently by the law«. That would mean the creation of yet another, 
fourth condition for a request that is not answered, to be presumed as 
accepted – in substantive laws it is explicitly stated that silence does not 
mean rejection, i.e. that silence represents acceptance. Now we can refer 
to the four conditions that must be fulfilled for each concrete case to lead 
to »silence-acceptance«:
1)  the procedure begins with a request of a party;
2)  the form and content of the request are established by law;
3)  the term for acting by the body conducting the procedure is stipu-
lated by a substantive law;
4)  it is established by the law that the party does not have the right 
to appeal as if its request has been rejected, when the decision 
has not been made within the stipulated term.
Article 227 of the LGAP regulates the competences of the bodies decid-
ing on appeals in administrative procedures. Partial amendments have 
been made to this article. With regard to the concrete acts passed by the 
Government, the latest legal changes have stipulated that administrative 
dispute can be launched against these acts by filing a lawsuit, since ap-
peal is not permitted. This change represents an attempt at conformity 
with the Law on Administrative Disputes (LAD), which was adopted 
one year after the LGAP (2006), and where there is an article stipulat-
ing that all concrete administrative acts passed by the Government are 
under jurisdiction of the Administrative Court. Another novelty within 
the administrative procedure is contained in the amended Article 227/5 
of the LGAP that stipulates, »In all cases within administrative procedure 
when a second-instance decision-making body has not been defined, the 
party can decide to file a lawsuit and launch an administrative dispute 
against the first-instance decision«. Article 227/5 would make more sense 
if Article 227/1 were abrogated. Article 227/1 stipulates that the body 
competent for deciding on appeals against first-instance administrative 
acts is the government committee for second-instance administrative de-
cisions. Recently, an excellent idea has been circulated in the public – it 
suggested eliminating the second-instance government committees that 
are established in accordance with substantive laws. It is not difficult to 
conclude that the Government prepares amendments to each substantive 
law that regulates specific kinds of administrative matter, including the 
articles within these laws that stipulate the existence of second-instance 
government committees and their competences. In order to abolish these 
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government committees, it is necessary to abrogate the article from the 
LGAP that establishes them as second-instance bodies. 
Article 242 has been amended with subsection 3, according to which a 
second-instance body, when deciding on an appeal for the second time 
(against an administrative act that has already been nullified once and re-
turned so that a second decision is permitted), is obligated to solve the case 
in a competent manner. This should be the brightest part of amendments 
to the LGAP. It also means strengthening the responsibility of both the 
controlling and the controlled bodies. The competences of the Admini-
strative Court to decide in full jurisdiction have been widened immensely 
by both the LAD and the LGAP. When deciding for a second time on ap-
peal against an already abrogated administrative act, the second-instance 
(control) body must solve the case and prevent the party from endlessly 
abusing his/her procedural rights. Whatever may be the case, such a situa-
tion renders possible the silence of second-instance administrative bodi es. 
Since in such a situation the legislator has not presumed that silence is ac-
ceptance, the articles from the LAD remain in force. According to these 
articles, the party has the right to a lawsuit against silence of the second-
 -instance body, as if his/her request has been rejected. 
2. The procedure according to which silence should becomes acceptance
After a short overview of the most important amendments to the LGAP 
connected to the institute of silence of administration and its meaning, 
we will proceed by analysing the final two articles related to the procedure 
through which »silence is acceptance« principle becomes operational. 
Concretely, we refer to Articles 293/1 and 293/b that have been trans-
ferred into an entirely new chapter XVIII titled »Special articles for ex-
ceptional cases when Article 129 of this Law is applied«. Through these, 
an entirely new, specific, and fairly complex administrative procedure is 
established; one that must be undertaken only if the previously mentioned 
four conditions, according to which silence becomes acceptance, apply. 
In essence, through these two articles the legislator has intended to imple-
ment declaratively the principle contained in Article 129, which states 
that silence sometimes becomes acceptance. The procedure is as follows:
1)  The condition that form and content of a party’s request must 
be regulated in advance, so that not answering becomes ac-
ceptance, is reemphasised once again. Still, a serious problem 
arises because of the contradiction between the two articles 
from the same Law – Article 129/1 stipulates that the form and 
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content of the request should be determined by a substantive 
law, while Article 293 stipulates that this can be done by either 
a substantive law or secondary legislation. The legislator has 
made a flagrant mistake by allowing the contradiction of two 
articles from the same amendments, so that bodies conducting 
administrative procedures now have discretion to choose which 
article from the Law they will apply. It is unnecessary to outline 
the changes created by the regulation of an issue with a law and 
its regulation with secondary legislation.
2)  The request should be filed in a form prepared by the body con-
ducting the procedure. Without such a form, the party cannot 
initiate an administrative procedure. The body must provide 
written instructions for filling in the form. 
3)  The party is obliged to fill in and file two identical forms (and 
one enclosure of evidence) of which the second (that must be 
signed by the entity authorized for receiving filings) is kept by 
the party. The entity authorized for receiving filings is obliged 
to record the name of the body, the date of reception, and any 
enclosures on the forms.  
4)  The competent body cannot remove the filing as incomplete if 
it is correctly filled in and has all the requested and necessary 
supplements incorporated and filled in within the form.  
5)  The competent body is obliged to decide on the filing in a term 
determined by the substantive law. It must be emphasised that 
in the entire procedure where silence becomes acceptance the 
general terms stipulated in the LGAP do not apply, but rather 
the terms stipulated in the specific substantive laws are applied, 
if such exist. 
6)  The competent body has a period of three (3) days from re-
ceiving the filing to check whether it contains all the neces-
sary information. If the filing contains formal deficiencies, the 
body will require the party that filed it to remove them within a 
stipulated period. If that is not done, the body will pass an act 
establishing that the filing has not been filed at all (a specific 
appeal against such a procedure is allowed). 
7)  Within Article 293/b, the legislator has described what will oc-
cur if the competent body is »silent«, i.e. does not make a deci-
sion within the term established in the substantive law. In such 
a situation, the party that filed the request (from the expiry of 
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the period for making a decision) can, within 3 days, require the 
head of the competent body to make a decision concluding that 
all conditions for silence of administration have been fulfilled, 
and that the request is accepted. This would mean that if in the 
substantive law there is a term of 8 days for the competent body 
to make a decision, and it does not do so, the citizen within the 
subsequent three days can refer to the official. In a case when 
the three-day-term has expired, the party can only file two new 
forms once again; they would need to be archived, completed 
with supplements, etc. 
8)  Once an official has received a request from a citizen (on the 
grounds of silence of administration) the official is obliged, 
within five days, to make a decision that will declare that the 
preconditions for silence of administration exist, and that the 
party’s request is accepted (Art. 129/a). The official declares 
an existing situation in this declarative act. It is well known in 
administrative-legal theory that declarative administrative acts 
do not create action themselves, but rather serve as a basis for 
passing constitutive acts, which can create genuine legal con-
sequences. That is why the legislator has been inconsistent and 
has not answered the question of where the party should refer, 
and what he/she should do with the official’s decision, which 
in a declarative manner states that the request of the party is 
accepted. Does the official ex officio send this decision to the 
competent body that has been silent, or does it have to be done 
by the party? Is the competent body, after receiving the deci-
sion, obliged to pass an act that it previously has not, in the 
stipulated term? Does the official have the right to order the 
competent body to pass certain administrative act? Does this 
not lead to breaching of the principle of autonomous decid-
ing on administrative issues, as a basic principle of the Law 
on Organization and Functioning of the State Administrative 
Bodies? Many issues have arisen with the implementation of 
amendments to the LGAP, and the legislator has not answered 
proficiently, i.e. has left a curtailed legal text. 
9)  The situation that is solved with the new Article 293b/3 is »si-
lence of the official«. Thus, the legislator has established that if 
the competent official does not pass the appropriate declarative 
act within five days, the party has the right to initiate an ad-
ministrative dispute. This stipulation deserves the strongest dis-
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approval. It is completely unclear against whom the party will 
initiate an administrative dispute. Administrative disputes can 
only be conducted against final administrative acts, yet here, 
because of the new concept of terms and deadlines, it is unclear 
when decisions not made by competent bodies become finali-
zed. Actually, administrative disputes can only by conducted 
against decisions that have not been made by the official, which 
is not necessary to the party. On the contrary, it would mean a 
lot more to the party if he/she received the concrete permit or 
licence, rather than receiving a declaration that their request 
has been accepted. Thus, it would be much better if the party 
could file an administrative dispute against the body in charge 
of issuing specific permit. However, that is impossible because 
an appeal against the silence of administrative bodies is not 
permitted, only a request to the official to make a decision for 
declaring that the request is presumed to be accepted. There 
is no finality of the act so it is unclear how the Administrative 
Court will act on such lawsuits. 
3. Old-new shortcomings in the Law on Administrative 
Disputes (LAD) of 2006
The LAD granted the right to conduct administrative disputes against 
secondary legislation, i.e. regulations passed by the Government and by-
laws passed by the bodies with public authority for the first time (Article 
2/2). Of course, some limitations were stipulated (to prevent conflict of 
competences between the Administrative Court and the Constitutional 
Court) according to which these regulations can be overseen in the con-
stitutional-judicial control only if they regulate individual relations. The 
Government often passes decrees, and thus fully regulates inter partes re-
lations i.e. enforces obligations or limits the rights of specific subjects, 
which in such situations have no judicial protection of their rights. That 
is why it would have been wise to keep such an article within the LAD: 
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court (finding that such an article be-
longs among its competences) abrogated this article by a decision of 13th 
February 2008.
Since 2007, not a single step has been taken to amend the LAD. This only 
makes the work of administrative judges harder and worsens the citizens’ 
position as parties in administrative disputes. It is necessary to reiterate 
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the most important legal inconsistencies once again and make sugges-
tions for their surpassing.   
The number and types of regular and special legal remedies and the com-
petences of the Supreme Court within the framework of administrative- 
-judicial protection are among the most important and complex issues. 
The basic intention of Article 40 is to strengthen the efficiency of admini-
strative dispute. However, at the same time it contains colossal technical 
mistakes that cause substantial problems during the implementation of 
the LAD, and complicate everyday duties of the Administrative Court. 
Concretely, Article 40 enumerates all the situations where the Adminis-
trative Court is obliged to decide with full jurisdiction. It refers to a wide 
array of subjects, i.e. it lists the cases of obligatory, competent judicial de-
cisions that as a rule go further then the previous legal solutions (in prac-
tice this led to a situation where there are no cases of full jurisdiction). If 
the new legal solution is applied in practice, administrative dispute will 
have the character of a dispute of full jurisdiction, and by exception a 
dispute of legality. However, for such a noble idea not to be misused nor 
turned into an empty promise, it is necessary to amend Article 40 imme-
diately. Specifically, this article stipulates that the Court must decide in 
full jurisdiction in the following cases:
–  if it is related to wrong application of the law;
–  if it is related to disputes on administrative contracts;
–  if it is related to the acts passed in a misdemeanour procedure;
–  if it comes to the prolonging of a procedure, and is related to a 
matter in which the factual situation is established in an adminis-
trative–judicial procedure;
–  if the competent body, after abrogating one administrative act, 
passes another administrative act contrary to the legal opinion of 
the Court, or contrary to the comments of the Court in relation 
to the procedure, so that the party files a new lawsuit, and
–  in a situation where there is silence of administration.
In the first reading of the Article, it is obvious that lines 5 and 6 regulate 
exactly the same material i.e. they duplicate each other. Line 6 is wider 
than line 5 so it should be left within the new legal text, while line 5 should 
be abolished.
The last line is rather contemporary, since it is connected to the meaning 
of silence of administration. Administrative judges will face a very serious 
dilemma as to how to continue in the future. 
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Furthermore, Article 40/5 of the LAD contains a contradiction in rela-
tion to the solution contained within Article 40/1, line 6. Specifically, it 
defines the silence of administration as a matter on which the Court is 
obliged to decide in a dispute of full jurisdiction. In our opinion, such a 
solution should be supported. Nevertheless, within the same Article 40/5 
it is stipulated that when a lawsuit is filed on the basis of silence of admini-
stration, and the Court finds it acceptable, it can accept the lawsuit by a 
verdict and choose in what manner the competent body will decide! This 
mistake seems technical at first, but in essence, it represents a preference 
of numerous problems and bewilderment when the Court decides upon a 
case. The Law stipulates two different imperative solutions for the same 
matter. This means that it is up to the concrete judicial council whether it 
will pass a competent decision that will fill the void that caused the initi-
ation of proceedings and administrative dispute (public administration’s 
failure silence, i.e. failure to decide on a party’s request). Furthermore, 
the judicial council can also reach a verdict that will oblige the body that 
has been silent to make a decision – something that will obviously not 
please the party in pursuit of justice. We assume that the second solution 
will be applied more often in practice if it continues to remain a legal pos-
sibility. Such misjudgement and flippancy with technical preparation of 
such an important legal text should not have occurred. Unfortunately, this 
was not the only mistake in the LAD. 
In an administrative dispute, appeal as a regular legal means, has always 
been an exception rather than a rule. Such an attitude can be supported 
with the fact that a regular two-instance proceeding exists within public 
administration, supplemented with seven special legal remedies, as well 
as the specialized administrative-judicial control over the legality of ad-
ministrative acts. The possibility of appeal against all verdicts of the Ad-
ministrative Court would only delay and tear the administrative-judicial 
protection. Thus, we feel that the appeal should only be allowed against 
the verdicts of the Administrative Court handed down in cases of full 
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the legislator has not stipulated such a pos-
sibility within Article 40, i.e. in the Article where all cases of obligatory 
competent deciding by the Court are listed. In fact, the legislator has not 
established appeal as a regular legal remedy against the verdicts of the 
Administrative Court, at all. The appeal is mentioned only in one article 
of the Law, but it is an obvious mistake, i.e. a solution that has been taken 
over from the previous Law, or from one of the many draft versions of the 
LAD. Article 39/2 stipulates, »Appeal against a verdict from Article 30/3 
of this Law is not permitted«, which is completely out of context. Oddly 
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enough, Article 30/3 stipulates the reasons why a party can request an oral 
hearing. It is obvious that an appeal cannot be in relation to this issue. 
The Administrative Court does not even decide with a formal verdict on 
conducting oral hearings.
What do the coarse mistakes of the people who drafted and adopted the 
LAD mean? A logical conclusion is that the Supreme Court no longer 
has any competences in relation to administrative disputes. As we can see 
from the analysis of legal provisions, the new LAD has not established ap-
peal as a legal remedy in the administrative-judicial procedure. In relation 
to the renewal of the administrative-judicial procedure (as the only special 
legal method), the situation is even clearer. Article 45 of the Law estab-
lished the competences of the Administrative Court in deciding on repeti-
tion in administrative-judicial procedures: »After a lawsuit for repeating 
the procedure, the decision is made by the Court that originally decided 
on the case, and to which the reason for repetition is related«.
From everything that has been said so far, it follows that the current form 
of Article 40 of the LAD is clearly inappropriate. It states, »Administra-
tive disputes in the Republic of Macedonia are decided by the Admin-
istrative Court as a first-instance court, and the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Macedonia decides (here a shortcoming is the implication 
»when«) on special legal remedies«. This article is not only inappropri-
ate, but also incorrect in the part where the competences of the Supreme 
Court are outlined!  
What is strange, and even disturbing, is that fact that the LAD was pub-
lished in the National Gazette two years ago, and the Ministry of Justice 
has not taken a single step towards editing this illogical and imprecise text. 
This could have been done with the simplest amendments to the Law. A 
few months ago, the competent officials within the Ministry formed a 
committee for drafting the amendments to the Law on Administrative 
Disputes. Since the working group’s suggestions have not been put up for 
public discussion it is assumed that they have still not finished.     
Hoping that this paper will help to create a route for amendments to the 
LAD, particularly in relation to legal remedies that can be used in the 
administrative-judicial procedure, we suggest the following:  
•  Firstly, appeal should be introduced, but only against decisions 
of the Administrative Court made in cases of full jurisdiction, i.e. 
when an administrative case is decided by a verdict of the Admi-
nistrative Court, which takes over the disputed decision entirely. 
In such a case, the right to appeal should be stipulated for both 
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the party that initiated the administrative dispute, and the body 
that passed the administrative act that has been nullified by the 
administrative dispute. 
•  Secondly, it is important to think about the court that will be 
competent to decide on appeal.
The following alternatives are possible, and each has advantages and dis-
advantages:
•  Firstly, the Supreme Court can decide on appeals (which would 
mean burdening the highest court with administrative-legal is-
sues – something that has so far caused the largest number of 
backlog cases in the Court). This would mean once again form-
ing a specialized Administrative Unit within the Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, this method would allow for devaluation as the ba-
sic means of appeal, and would ensure greater independence in 
deciding;
•  Secondly, a council of five judges can decide on appeals, within 
the Administrative Court. This solution is in accordance with the 
principle of specialization of judges who decide on administrative 
cases, and is in line with the long awaited functional decentraliza-
tion and intended relief of the Supreme Court. However, in this 
manner the issue of devaluation of appeal is put into question, as 
well as the objectiveness of decision-making. When first-instance 
and second-instance decision making is given to the same court, 
there is an obvious problem of jurisdiction.
3. Conclusion
Administrative-procedural matter is regulated by two key laws, which 
are adopted by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly of the Republic of 
Macedonia; the Law on General Administrative Procedure and the Law 
on Administrative Disputes. It is obvious that both laws need to be tested 
in practice, i.e. in real societal relations between administrative bodies and 
citizens. Unfortunately, certain legal provisions within both Laws lack ap-
plicability – their application in citizens’ everyday lives seems to be quite 
impossible. Thus, the point of our paper is to inform about the mistakes, 
contradictions, and empty spaces that are found in these key procedural 
laws. The final decision in terms of (not)taking tangible measures remains 
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in the hands of the competent bodies – the Ministry of Justice, the Go-
vernment and the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.
REALIZING THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS THROUGH THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISPUTE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Summary
The first Macedonian Law on General Administrative Procedure was passed in 
2005 and was aimed at modernizing administrative procedures. The amendments 
of 2008 challenged certain core solutions, such as the silence of administration 
institute. There is a change from negative presumption to positive presumption, 
when first-instance public administrative body is inactive. In other words, when 
such a body, at citizens’ request, does nothing in certain term, the presumption 
is that it accepts citizens’ request. The aim of such a legislative solution is to in-
crease the efficiency of public administration. Detailed legal analysis of the new 
regulation is presented in the paper. It is followed by similar analysis of the Law 
on Administrative Disputes of 2006. Numerous shortcomings are identified and 
certain proposals for improvement are presented in the paper, both with regard 
to administrative procedure and administrative dispute.
Key words: general administrative procedure – Macedonia, administrative dis-
pute, silence of administration, legal protection of the citizens’ rights, adminis-
trative efficiency  
HJU-2009-01-Book.indb   139 26.3.2009   15:03:54
140
Davitkovski  i Pavlovska-Daneva: Realizing Citizens’ Rights ...
HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 9. (2009.), br. 1., str. 125–140
HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA
OSTVARIVANJE PRAVA GRA!ANA U UPRAVNOM 
POSTUPKU I UPRAVNOM SPORU 
U MAKEDONIJI
Sa"etak
Prvi makedonski Zakon o op#em upravnom postupku donesen je 2005. da bi se 
moderniziralo upravno djelovanje. Novela Zakona iz 2008. donijela je duboke 
promjene nekih od klju$nih instituta, kao %to je %utnja uprave. U pogledu postu-
panja prvostupanjskih upravnih tijela pre%lo se s negativne presumpcije na 
pozitivnu presumpciju – kad prvostupanjsko upravno tijelo u povodu zahtjeva 
stranke u odre&enom roku ne donese upravni akt, smatra se da je zahtjev stranke 
usvojen. Svrha je takvog rje%enja pove#ati efikasnost u javnoj upravi. U radu je u 
detaljno analizirana nova pravna regulacija upravnog postupanja, kao i Zako-
na o upravnom sporu iz 2006. Utvr&eno je mno%tvo nedostataka te predlo"eno 
vi%e pobolj%anja, kako u pogledu upravnog postupka, tako i u pogledu upravnog 
spora. 
Klju!ne rije!i: op#i upravni postupak – Makedonija, upravni spor, %utnja up-
rave, pravna za%tita prava gra&ana, efikasnost javne uprave
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